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Diffuse support for the European Union: spillover effects of the politicization of the 
European integration process at the domestic level 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the link between attitude formation at the national and the supranational level of 
the European Union (EU). While the existing studies have provided strong evidence that attitudes towards 
national institutions fundamentally condition attitudes towards the EU, the mechanisms through which 
these spillovers occur are not clearly spelled out. Our main contribution is to theorize the complex ways in 
which the national politicization of the European integration process affects support for the EU by 
focusing on critical moments in the EU integration process, and the electoral fortunes of the political 
parties doing the cuing. To test our theoretical claims, we employ multilevel models using six rounds of 
the European Social Survey combined with party level data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey, and various 
country-level data. The analyses show that spillover effects are crucially conditioned by the level of 
politicization of European integration at the national level.  
 






This paper investigates the link between attitude formation at the national and supranational level 
of the European Union (EU). We are interested in unpacking the specific mechanisms through 
which support for and the legitimacy of national institutions affects the legitimacy of the 
European level of governance. We start from the same premise as Hooghe and Marks (2008: 2), 
who have noted that ‘[d]omestic and European politics have become more tightly coupled as 
governments have become responsive to public pressures on European integration’. In studying 
this coupling between domestic and European politics in terms of political support, we build on 
three recent studies by Hobolt (2012), Armingeon and Ceka (2014) and Harteveld et al. (2013), 
who have adopted Easton’s (1975) heuristic framework to come to terms with the problem of the 
legitimacy of the European Union in the eyes of its citizens. Our study builds on these three 
contributions and offers a more comprehensive account of how and under what circumstances 
domestic support influences diffuse support for the EU.  
While the existing studies have provided strong evidence that attitudes towards national 
institutions fundamentally condition attitudes towards the EU, the mechanisms through which 
this happens are not clearly spelled out. Most of the existing research linking support for national 
institutions to support for the EU relies on cue theory according to which national political actors 
provide cues to their supporters regarding European integration. What is less clear from the extant 
research is the origin of these cues (i.e. who is doing the cuing), and how exactly they operate. 
Our main contribution is to theorize the complex ways in which the national politicization of the 
European integration process affects support for the EU by focusing on critical moments in the 
EU integration process, and the electoral fortunes of the political parties doing the cuing.  
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Therefore, the argument we propose is twofold. First, and in line with other studies, we argue that 
both specific and diffuse support for national institutions spills over to support for the EU. If 
citizens are dissatisfied with the performance of their national government or are distrustful of 
national institutions, they will be less likely to support the EU. It might be useful to think of this 
as the baseline model of spillover effects during times with relatively low levels of politicization 
of the EU. Second, we theorize the conditions under which politicization of European integration 
and the heightened cues from national political actors moderate the spillovers between the two 
levels of government. For our purposes, the most important actors involved in politicizing Europe 
are national governments and political parties. Specifically, at critical moments of the EU 
integration process when national governments become focal points in the relationship between a 
given country and the EU, specific support for national governments plays a bigger role than 
usual in shaping views towards the EU. Examples of such critical points include the eastern 
enlargement, referenda, and publicized conflicts between a national government and the EU.  
Political parties are essential in aggregating and representing citizen interests but also in molding 
attitudes in the two-way street that is representative democracy. As such, we expect the cues 
parties give to their followers regarding European integration to have a significant impact on 
support for the EU. In this regard, domestic arenas where European integration is highly 
politicized, usually by Eurosceptic parties, will be home to more Europeans harboring deep anti-
EU sentiments. Among these Europeans, supporters of Eurosceptic parties who find themselves 
as electoral losers in national elections will be particularly likely to channel their discontent with 
governing parties towards the EU. 
It is possible that the coupling between national and EU support can be the result of reciprocal 
spillovers. Thus, Mair (2013: 117f.) argued that there may be a negative spillover effect from EU 
politics to national politics: because the European Parliament fails to generate much commitment 
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and enthusiasm on the part of citizens, it may – through contagion or learning – lead to declining 
commitment and enthusiasm for national institutions. Although we do not deny the possibility of 
spillovers of diffuse support from the European to the domestic level, following the preceding 
studies, we assume that it is primarily national support that drives EU support: it is national 
politics with which citizens are most familiar and where most of the political socialization occurs; 
it is also at the national level that European integration is politicized and where citizens take their 
cues with respect to European integration.  
We begin by presenting our theoretical considerations. We then move on to the description of our 
data, operationalizations and estimation procedures, before we present the results, which will, 




Studies of political support regularly take as their point of departure David Easton’s seminal 
work, and so do we. As is well known, Easton (1965, 1975) distinguished between two modes of 
support (diffuse and specific) and three objects of support (the authorities, the regime, and the 
community). He conceived diffuse support as a basic ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will 
that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which 
they see as damaging to their wants.’ He equated diffuse support to the belief in the legitimacy of 
the political object (a regime, a government, or a politician), or, alternatively, to trust in the given 
object. By contrast, as he conceived of specific support, it was related to ‘the satisfactions that 
members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political 
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authorities’ (Easton 1975: 437). In other words, specific support is based on the economic and 
political performance of the political object in question.  
Given this distinction, it is important to keep in mind that, according to Easton’s (1975: 446; 
1965: 119-20) conception, diffuse support is not only based on normative procedural beliefs, but 
may also be ‘a product of spillover effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of 
performance over a long period of time’. This is to say that specific support based on one’s own 
experiences with the political authorities, institutions or with the political regime as a whole may 
give rise to diffuse support in the long run. If socialization into the ideals of democracy plays a 
central role for fostering diffuse support to democratic regimes, the authorities’ ability to find and 
implement satisfactory solutions to basic policy problems or the fact that your own party is in 
government may also contribute to the ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will’. Con-
versely, as Linz (1978: 54) has observed: ‘Unsolved structural problems… undermine the 
efficacy and, in the long run, the legitimacy of the regime.’ Thus, if adverse economic conditions 
persist for a more extended period, as has been the case in some countries during the current 
Great Recession, the deteriorating economic conditions may have long-term effects on diffuse 
support, which cannot be easily repaired by possible future upswings.  
In a multi-level governance system like the European Union, the relationship between diffuse and 
specific support is complicated by the fact that the supranational level of governance is added to 
the national level. However, existing studies have successfully extended Easton’s framework to 
conceptualize the multidimensional and multilevel nature of EU support (Boomgaarden et al. 
2011), and to theorize the role that political community plays in attitude formation towards the 
EU (Weßels 2007). Since we are primarily interested in the link between support for national and 
EU institutions, we focus on support for political authorities and the institutions they run at both 
levels of government as the objects of political support. Our basic argument is that diffuse as well 
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as specific support, or the lack thereof, may spill over from the national level to the supranational 
level.  
Several studies have provided evidence for such spillover effects with respect to diffuse support. 
Thus, Hobolt (2012) showed that trust in national parliament contributes to the citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy in the EU, while Harteveld et al. (2013) and Armingeon and Ceka 
(2014) documented the contribution of trust in national institutions to trust in the EU. As a matter 
of fact, trust in national institutions proved to be by far the most important determinant of trust in 
the EU. These previous studies differed with respect to their interpretation of these spillover 
effects. Building on Anderson (1998, pp. 574–5), both Hobolt (2012) and Armingeon and Ceka 
(2014) suggest that, given the low levels of awareness about the EU among citizens of member 
states, attitudes about the EU may essentially reflect more firmly held attitudes about the national 
political reality. This is especially true for citizens of new member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe for whom the EU is even more remote (Wagner 2012). In other words, trust in 
national institutions functions as a cue for attitudes about the EU. By contrast, Harteveld et al. 
(2013) suggest that the close association between the trust in national and EU institutions results 
from a common source, a ‘trust syndrome’, the origins of which they propose to locate in 
personality characteristics. The two sources of association between diffuse support at the national 
and supranational level are not mutually exclusive, but might well both contribute to the observed 
close association. This, however, has not been tested by previous studies. 
It is important to note that in Easton’s framework diffuse support is more stable than fluctuating 
evaluations of performance that track closely economic outcomes. Thus, to test the full 
implications of Easton’s theory, we would need panel data, which we unfortunately do not have. 
But there are good reasons to believe that, in the case of the EU, the spillover effect from specific 
to diffuse support are direct and nearly simultaneous. Ever since Scharpf (1999) introduced the 
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distinction between input- and output legitimacy into the discussion of the legitimacy of the EU, 
the literature has suggested that, because of its inadequate democratic input procedures and the 
lack of accountability of its decision-makers, the EU mainly relies on output legitimacy. This, as 
Hobolt and Tilley (2014:134) have indicted, implies that ‘the legitimacy of the EU institutions 
hinges almost exclusively on its performance.’ In fact, these scholars have confirmed empirically 
that citizens who hold the EU responsible for its policy output, indeed, respond to poor economic 
performance (as in the Great Recession) with diminished trust in the EU institutions (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2014, Chapter 8). 1 This means that, at least among citizens who identify the EU as 
responsible for the economic counter-performances during the Great Recession, the EU bears the 
brunt of poor (domestic) economic performance (see also Gomez [2015]; Serricchio, Tsakatika, 
and Quaglia [2013]). 
We would like to suggest, however, that most citizens above all hold the national government 
responsible for the domestic economic performance. Even if EU policies increasingly have a 
direct impact on the performance of the national economy, and even if national governments 
blame the EU for poor domestic economic performance, most citizens are unlikely to discern 
much difference between the policies of the EU and those of their national government. Given 
that the visibility of EU politics is much lower than that of national politics, they tend to blame 
the national government in the first place and, as Hobolt (2012: 95) suggests, ‘use the national 
level as a proxy when evaluating how the EU functions.’ If this is the case and if the EU’s diffuse 
support relies disproportionally on its ability to deliver outcomes, specific and diffuse support 
would track one another much more closely and directly than it is implied by Easton’s theory. 
Accordingly, we expect the evaluation of the national government’s performance to be the key 
mediator between the citizens’ evaluation of economic performance, on the one hand, and diffuse 
support of national and EU institutions, on the other hand. In line with this argument, Hobolt 
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(2012) not only documents spillover effects of domestic economic performance on diffuse 
support at the EU level, but, crucially, also provides evidence for such spillover effects of one’s 
satisfaction with the national government (government approval).  
This argument implies that a decline in institutional trust at the EU level is not necessarily due to 
a lack of accountability at the supranational level. It may also be the result of the proper 
functioning of the accountability mechanism: holding the national governments accountable for 
the economic performance contributes, indirectly, to the accountability of the decision-makers at 
the EU-level (who are, in part at least, identical with the key members of national governments) 
and to corresponding spillover effects with respect to diffuse support at that level.  
Summarizing this literature, we expect both diffuse and specific support of national political 
institutions to influence diffuse support in EU institutions. We expect: 
H1:  higher dissatisfaction with economic performance to directly lead to more dissatisfaction 
with national government performance (domestic specific support); 
H2: higher dissatisfaction with national government performance (domestic specific support) to 
directly lead to lower trust in national institutions (domestic diffuse support) and directly and 
indirectly (via trust in national institutions) to lower trust in EU institutions (diffuse EU 
support); 
H3:  lower trust in national institutions (domestic diffuse support) to lead to lower trust in EU 
institutions (diffuse EU support); 
H4: independently of the impact of economic and government performance, trust in national and 
EU institutions to also be a function of individual ‘trust and satisfaction syndromes.’ 
Figure 1 displays the way we conceive of the general relationship between specific (performance-
related) and diffuse (trust-related) support in the two-level polity of the European Union, taking 
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into account the impact of individual ‘trust/satisfaction syndromes.’ Note that, to keep the figure 
as simple as possible, we have not drawn any direct effects of crisis conditions or economic 
dissatisfaction on specific or diffuse political support at either the national or the EU level. We do 
not exclude that such direct effects exist, but we assume that the economic crisis exerts an effect 
on political support mainly via the individual’s evaluation of the country’s economic 
performance, and that this evaluation, in turn, mainly influences diffuse support via its effect on 
specific political support. 
 <FIGURE 1> 
Let us next focus on the mechanisms responsible for the spillover effects from the national to the 
EU level.  Following previous research (Armingeon and Ceka [2014]; Hobolt [2012]; 
Steenbergen et al. [2007]; Vössing [2015]) we suggest that cues provided by political actors play 
a decisive role for such spillover effects. The unresolved question is, however, where these cues 
come from, and how they are establishing a link between national and supranational support. In 
order to discuss this question, we would like to introduce the concept of the politicization of the 
European integration process at the national level. Following Schattschneider (1960), we can 
define politicization as the expansion of conflict within a political system, which, as Hutter and 
Grande (2014) as well as de Wilde et al. (2016: 4) have argued, can be broken down into three 
components – salience (the conflict’s visibility), actor expansion (its scope), and actor 
polarization (its intensity). Following Hutter and Grande, we assume that only issues that are 
raised by political actors in public debates can be considered to be politicized. Salience is the 
most basic dimension of politicization, but it is not the only one. Actor expansion refers to the 
types of actors involved in the public debate. In the case of the European integration process, it is 
common knowledge that the process has been dominated by executive actors from both the 
national (governments and their agents) and the European level (Commission, European Council, 
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Council of Ministers). Politicization of European integration implies the extension of the actors 
involved in the debate on the EU beyond the narrow circle of executive actors, above all to actors 
in the domestic party systems. Third, the intensity component of politicization refers to the degree 
to which the participants in the debate take opposing positions. Politicization is especially high, if 
a controversy is not only salient, but also involves sharply opposing views among the participants 
to the debate.  
For our purposes, we would like to distinguish between two types of politicization of the Euro-
pean integration process at the national level, one involving national governments, and one 
involving national political parties. As far as national governments are concerned, they constitute, 
as already observed, the key national actors when it comes to the management of the relationship 
between the EU and its member states. First of all, it is the national governments who negotiate a 
country’s accession to the EU – as happened in the Eastern enlargement round in 2004, and with 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and of Croatia in 2013. Second, once a country is 
a member of the EU, it is the national governments who become the key actors linking national 
politics to European politics: they represent the member states in the EU’s intergovernmental 
channel of representation (the European Council and the Council of Ministers) and they are 
charged with the implementation of European policies in the member states. During the Euro-
crisis, the key role of the national governments has become particularly visible for the general 
public, because the crisis management has primarily been executed within the intergovernmental 
channel of representation at the EU level, and because the national governments of the debtor 
states were obliged to implement the harsh programs imposed by the European and other 
supranational actors (the ‘Troika’ most notably). Some have even concluded that the EU’s policy 
process was increasingly characterized by ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015).  
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But the Euro-crisis has by no means been the only occasion when national governments have 
played a highly visible role in the relationship between national and EU politics. We generally 
expect increased spillover effects from specific support of the national government to diffuse 
support of EU institutions at critical moments of the EU integration process, when the role of the 
national government in this process becomes particularly salient (H5). As a corollary, we at the 
same time expect that the direct spillovers from diffuse national support to diffuse EU support are 
reduced at these critical moments (H5a). As the relationship between national politics and EU 
integration becomes more transparent and diffuse support at the EU level becomes more 
conditional on the national political performance, citizens are less likely to rely on diffuse 
national support as a proxy for diffuse EU support. 
The second type of politicization more explicitly involves the national parties. We know from 
previous studies (see, e.g., Hooghe and Marks [2008]; Hutter et al. [forthcoming]) that political 
parties are particularly relevant for the politicization of European integration at the national level. 
Accordingly, we expect the degree of politicization of European integration within the national 
party system to have an influence on the diffuse support of European institutions. Early on, 
Schmitter (1969) had expected this effect to be a positive one, i.e. the higher salience of European 
integration would lead to more support for Europe. However, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) have 
shown that increasing salience of European integration does not invariably increase support for 
Europe. As a matter of fact, given that the politicization of Europe has been primarily driven by 
parties critical of European integration (de Wilde et al. [2016: 6]; Hoeglinger [2016: 55]), we 
expect the politicization of European integration in the national party system to have a primarily 
negative direct impact on diffuse support of European institutions (H6).  
Moreover, irrespective of the politicization of the EU issue at the national or supranational level, 
we expect respondents to follow cues provided by the parties they support in forming their diffuse 
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support towards the EU. Hence, the adherents of Eurosceptic parties, who will be attentive to the 
critical cues provided by their parties, will be particularly unlikely to support European institu-
tions, independently of whatever spillover effects we may find from diffuse and specific support 
of national institutions to diffuse support of EU institutions (H7). 
In addition to these direct effects of party positioning on diffuse support for EU institutions, we 
also expect the cues provided by parties to their voters on the issue of EU integration to moderate 
the spillover effects from specific support of the national government to diffuse support of EU 
institutions. This moderating effect hinges on the distinction between winners and (Eurosceptic) 
losers of national elections. It is well known that the losers of national elections are less 
supportive of domestic democratic institutions than the winners (Anderson et al. 2005). In 
particular, we can expect the losers to be less supportive of the national government than the 
winners (who have voted for the parties which control the government) – independently of how 
well this government actually performs. Once we control for support of the national government, 
however, losers may not be less supportive of EU institutions. Their diffuse political 
dissatisfaction/distrust may be entirely driven by their dissatisfaction with the national govern-
ment by which they do not feel adequately represented. But the dissatisfaction with the national 
government can be expected to have particularly important spillover effects on trust in European 
institutions for Eurosceptic losers: given that, with few exceptions, national governments tend to 
support the European integration process, the fact that one does not feel adequately represented 
by the national government is likely to be particularly consequential in terms of diffuse support of 
EU institutions for Eurosceptic losers (H8).  
To summarize, we expect: 
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H5: increased spillover effects from specific support of the national government to diffuse 
support of EU institutions at critical moments of the EU integration process; 
H5a: decreased spillovers from diffuse national support to diffuse EU support at critical moments 
of the EU integration process (H5a); 
H6: a negative effect of the politicization of European integration at the national level on diffuse 
support of EU institutions, independently of spillover effects; 
H7: a negative effect of adherence to Eurosceptic parties on diffuse support for EU institutions, 
independently of spillover effects; 
H8: an increased spillover effect from specific support for the national government to diffuse 
support for EU institutions for Eurosceptic electoral losers. 
 
Data and operationalization 
To test these hypotheses we rely on a dataset that combines information from three different 
levels – data characterizing the economic situation and the critical moments in a given country 
and at a given point in time, data on the position that parties take on European integration 
(weighted by the salience parties attribute to this issue), and data at the individual level on 
specific and diffuse support, trust and satisfaction syndromes, and other control factors. The 
individual level data we use come from the six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), 
which have been fielded every other year from 2002 to 2012. The party level data come from 
three rounds (2002, 2006 and 2010) of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). To combine the 
CHES party level data with the ESS we needed to assign parties to individual respondents2. To do 
this we relied on information from two items in the ESS: the party the respondent voted for in the 
last national election and the party the respondent felt closest to at the time of the survey. If 
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individuals voted for a party in the last national election they were assigned that party. If they did 
not report having voted for a party, they were assigned the party they felt closest to3. It is 
important to keep in mind that by limiting the analyses to respondents that can be considered 
partisans the number of observations in the analyses is reduced by a third.4 In the data used for 
the analyses individuals who support the same party are, hence, nested in the party units, and 
these party units are further nested into country-year units. 
Our main dependent variable is trust in the European Parliament (EP). This is the only indicator 
of institutional trust at the European level that is available in the ESS. Correspondingly, we chose 
trust in the national parliament as our indicator for diffuse support at the national level. At the 
individual level, the key independent variables of interest are satisfaction with the way the 
government is doing its job and satisfaction with the present state of the country’s economy, 
which we take as indicators for specific support. All four trust variables are measured on an 11-
point scale. Additionally, we include in all models a measure of the trust and satisfaction 
syndromes, which were constructed from items in the ESS asking about trust towards different 
objects (other than those mentioned above).5 The logic for controlling for the satisfaction 
syndrome is that if you are satisfied with a wide range of phenomena, your satisfaction is to some 
extent independent of the phenomenon in question and reflects basic psychological 
predispositions. We include a dummy indicator of whether respondents are adherents of a 
governing party (winners=1) or of an opposition party (losers=0). Other control variables include 
gender, age, and level of education. At the level of parties, we introduce the position with respect 
to the European integration process of the party the individual adheres to. This is calculated based 
on the party’s position on European integration weighted by the relative salience of European 
integration in the party’s public stance (as measured in CHES). 
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At the country-year level, we first introduce a continuous measure of politicization of the issue of 
European integration, which takes into account two aspects of the concept of politicization – 
salience and polarization – and corresponds to the product of the weighted average salience and 
the degree of polarization of this issue in a given party system.6 At this level we also introduce 
two control variables indicating whether or not the country has been subject to IMF-
conditionality in the year in question, and whether a country receives benefits from the EU or 
whether it is a net payer.7 
To address hypothesis H5 and assess the impact of critical moments on government-related 
spillover effects we identify five key critical moments which we consider to be the most 
important critical moments of the period under study: 
• The first effect relates to Eastern enlargement: in May 2004, the year of the second ESS-
round, ten Central- and Eastern European countries became members of the European Union. 
Six of these countries – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 
– were part of the second ESS-round. In these six countries, the issue of EU-integration and 
the role of their national government in this process were particularly salient in this year. 
• The second effect refers to the impact of EU referenda. It is well known that referenda 
heavily contribute to the politicization of the European integration process (see Hutter et al., 
forthcoming). Two referenda, both in Ireland, took place in a country covered by the ESS 
that year – the first Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008 and the Irish 
referendum on the Fiscal Compact in May 2012. 
• Two effects relate to the euro-crisis – one refers to Greece (a ‘debtor’ country) and one to 
Finland (a ‘creditor’ country). Greece has been the object of a first bail-out in May 2010, a 
year when Greece was covered by the ESS. This was the beginning of a large-scale revolt of 
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the Greek population against the terms imposed by the ‘Troika’ on Greece, and against the 
Papandreou government that had accepted these terms. In Finland, the Greek bail-outs and 
the euro-crisis they unleashed became key issues in the May 2011 elections, which saw the 
rise of the True Finns, a populist radical-right party that skillfully exploited the rampant 
dissatisfaction of the Finns with their government’s support of these bail-outs into the year 
2012. 
• Last, but not least, we introduce an effect for three instances of governments that provoked 
conflicts with the European Union. While satisfaction with the government is usually 
positively related to trust in the EU institutions, in these three cases, the opposite is expected 
to hold. The first of these three cases concerns the British government under David Cameron 
in 2010 and 2012, which explicitly turned against the policy adopted by the Eurozone 
members. The British government not only opposed the bail-outs, but it also strongly rejected 
structural reforms. Its refusal to sign up to the Fiscal Compact on December 9, 2011, 
illustrates this point. Cameron’s veto forced the other member states to opt for an inter-
governmental treaty (instead of EU law) to adopt the Fiscal Compact – following an 
approach they had already adopted in the case of the Schengen treaty in 1985.8 The second 
case refers to the Orban government of Hungary, which came to power in May 2010, and 
whose illiberal constitutional reforms which entered into force on January 1, 2012, met with 
increasing national and European criticism. Finally, the third case concerns the Slovak Fico 
government which faced controversies with the EU in 2006 due to its affiliation with radical 
populist right parties (Fico’s party was suspended from the Party of European Socialists at 
the EU-level) and again in 2008 because of its explicitly anti-European position of not recog-
nizing Kosovo. The British governments in 2010 and 2012, the Hungarian government in 
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2012 and the Slovak government in 2006 and 2008 are hence coded as anti-EU governments, 
for which we expect a negative effect of government support on trust in EU institutions. 
 
Model estimation 
Our modeling strategy applies a three level structure, while individuals are hierarchically nested 
within parties, parties are not perfectly nested within country and year units. Given this non-
hierarchical structure of the data we need to specify crossed random effects models. In our 
estimation we treat respondents as nested within a cross-classification of parties and country-year 
units. The parties respondents voted for are treated as level-2 units, and we use 108 random 
effects for the country-year combinations at level-3 (all nested within a single artificial super 
cluster) (see Beretvas 2011, Leckie 2013). For the relationships between our indicators of specific 
and diffuse support, we not only estimate the direct effect of satisfaction with the national 
government on trust in the EP, but we also calculate the indirect effect through trust in the 
national parliament. Assuming uncorrelated residuals, the calculation of indirect effects is 
straightforward (see Duncan 1975): we can just multiply the regression coefficients along 
corresponding causal paths.9 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents the results from the multi-level regression analyses of trust in the EP. Model 1 
presents a base model that excludes the two variables capturing the trust and satisfaction 
syndromes. The results from this model indicate that there is a strong association between trust in 
the national parliament and trust in the EP: a one unit increase in trust in the national parliament 
raises trust in the EP by 0.463 points (on the 0-10 scale). This coefficient is, however, 
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substantially reduced in Model 2, where we introduce the control for the trust and satisfaction 
syndromes. In this second model, a one unit increase in trust in the national parliament is 
associated with an increase of 0.153 points of trust in the EP. The significantly reduced effects 
show that we tend to overestimate the spillover effect from the domestic to the EU-level, if we do 
not take into account the variation that exists between individuals in terms of overall satisfaction 
and trust and which reflects basic psychological predispositions. Similarly, the spillover effects 
from specific support of the national government to diffuse support at the EU level are still 
significant, although much less substantial. The coefficient for satisfaction with the national 
government is more than halved (from 0.136 to 0.062), while the spillover effect of satisfaction 
with the national economy even turns out to be no longer significantly associated with trust in the 
EP in Model 2. 
<TABLE 1> 
An unexpected result from Model 2 is that being a supporter of a governing party (Winner) 
decreases trust in the EP by 0.131 points, compared to supporters of national opposition parties. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that given the higher support that ‘winners’ have for 
national governments (see Table 2), there is a higher opportunity cost of delegating sovereignty 
up to the European Union (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). Consistent with other studies (Armingeon and 
Ceka, 2014), IMF-conditionality has no significant effect on trust in the EP (neither in Model 1 or 
2). However, as we shall show below, it does have a significantly negative effect on trust in the 
national parliament. This suggests that IMF-conditionality mainly undermines diffuse support at 
the national level– an issue to which we shall return in the final discussion. Referring also to the 
country-year level, the negative coefficient (-0.632) associated with the politicization index 
indicates that higher salience and polarization around the issue of EU integration decreases trust 
in the European Parliament, which confirms H6. At the party level, the coefficient for weighted 
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EU position is positive, indicating that the more supportive a party is of European integration, the 
higher the trust in the EP among its supporters. This confirms H7 and indicates that the parties’ 
role in how domestic attitudes relate to EU diffuse support goes beyond the issue of 
politicization, because the cues parties send to their supporters have an impact independently of 
the degree of politicization of European integration. Let us add that the EU balance for a given 
country and year has the expected sign: the more benefits a state receives from the EU the higher 
the diffuse support for the EP among its citizens. 
Model 3 in Table 1 adds the interactive terms that account for the moderating effect of critical 
moments in the European integration process on spillover effects from diffuse and specific 
support at the national level on diffuse support at the European level. As a result of the 
introduction of these interactive terms, the coefficients for the main effects of trust in national 
parliament and satisfaction with the national government now indicate how trust in the EP 
responds to changes on those two variables for country-year combinations that do not constitute 
critical moments. These effects are very similar to those in model 2, which is not surprising, 
given that the critical moments we introduced concern only a few country-year combinations. 
Let us now consider the moderating impact of the politicization of European integration at critical 
moments. With respect to spillover effects from domestic specific support to diffuse support for 
EU institutions, we find that this type of spillover is, as we expected, enhanced or attenuated at 
critical moments of the EU integration process, depending on the stance of national governments 
(H5). Four of the five coefficients introduced in this model are statistically significant and signed 
as expected. One of them (Eastern enlargement*Satisfaction with government) is in the expected 
direction but is not statistically significant. The strongest effects we find for the two Euro crisis 
cases – Finland and Greece. In both cases, satisfaction with the domestic government has an 
enhanced effect on trust in the EP at the height of the crisis (an additional 0.164 and 0.110 points 
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in the trust scale respectively for each of these cases). Additionally, in the case of national 
governments that stood in opposition to the EU, the interactive term has a negative coefficient, 
which indicates that in these cases the spillover effects from satisfaction with the national 
government to trust in the European institutions are reduced. These results confirm our 
expectations about the crucial moderating role of politicization of European integration at critical 
moments on the spillover effects from domestic specific to diffuse European support. 
As hypothesized in H5a, all the effects of the cross-level interactions between critical moments in 
EU integration and domestic trust are negative and, with the exception of Finland, statistically 
significant, confirming that at critical moments citizens are less likely to rely on diffuse national 
support as a proxy for diffuse EU support. 
 
<TABLE 2> 
Table 2 presents the three-level regression analysis of satisfaction (Model 1) and of trust (Model 
2) in the national parliament.  Model 1 in this table provides evidence in favor of hypothesis 1 
about the consequences of satisfaction with the national economy on domestic specific support. 
Satisfaction with the economy has a highly significant effect on satisfaction with the national 
government. An improvement of one point in the respondents’ satisfaction with the economy is 
associated with an increase of 0.484 points in satisfaction with the national government, even 
controlling for the impact of the satisfaction syndrome. 
Model 2 in Table 2 presents the regressions results for trust in the national parliament. Thus, 
satisfaction with the national government, satisfaction with the country’s economy, and the trust 
syndrome are positively associated with trust in the national parliament, with the strongest impact 
coming from the trust syndrome (with a coefficient of 0.724), followed by satisfaction with the 
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national government (0.218). This confirms previous findings in the existing literature on 
spillover effects from specific to diffuse support at the national level, and the positive association 
between trust in political institutions and overall levels of trust (in other institutions). In contrast 
to EP trust, being under IMF conditionality significantly influences trust in the national 
parliament, decreasing it on average by 0.366 points. This finding is consistent with Armingeon 
and Guthmann’s (2014) recent study that also shows a negative impact of IMF/EU conditionality 
on satisfaction with democracy and trust in the national parliament. Also in contrast to the 
analyses on EP trust, politicization of the issue of European integration at the party level has a 
positive effect on domestic trust (although only significant at the 0.10 level). The higher the 
salience and polarization of the issue of European integration in the national party system, the 
higher the levels of trust in the national parliament and the lower the trust in the European 
parliament. These combined findings are actually not surprising and can be explained by the fact 
that European integration in these polarized settings is framed as undermining national 
sovereignty thus leading, in a defensive reaction, to higher levels of support for national 
institutions. In other words, in domestic arenas where European integration is successfully 
politicized, the European Union is portrayed as constantly undermining national democracy 
which resides in the national parliament. Therefore, increased politicization would lead to more 
trust in the national parliament and less trust in the EP.  
<FIGURE 2> 
Model 2 in Table 2 permits us to compute indirect effects of satisfaction with the national 
government on EP trust. Using the information from this model and from model 3 in table 2 we 
can calculate the total (direct and indirect) effects of satisfaction with the government on EP trust 
at the different critical moments of the EU integration process. These total effects are presented in 
Figure 2. As shown in this figure, the resulting differences in the spillover effects of government 
22 
 
satisfaction on EP trust between the different critical moments are substantial. The total effects 
range from almost zero (for governments opposing the EU) to 0.256 (Finland). In the case of 
Finland, this means that an increase of one point in satisfaction with the national government 
leads to an increase of 0.256 points in trust in the EP, compared to almost no effect in the case of 
a government opposing the EU, for which the direct and indirect effects virtually cancel out. For 
countries and years in which the EU integration is not particularly politicized (absent of critical 
moments) for each unit increase in satisfaction with the government for a respondent EP trust will 
increase in total (and on average) by 0.098 points. 
Finally, we test H8 which states that there should be higher spillover effect from specific support 
for the national government to diffuse support for the EU for Eurosceptic electoral losers. To do 
so, we present the results for a three-way interactive model in which the spillover effects from 
satisfaction with government on EP trust are moderated simultaneously by whether the 
respondent is a supporter of an incumbent or an opposition party (i.e. whether she is an election 
winner or loser) and by the position taken by this party on the issue of European integration. As 
the coefficient of the three-way interaction term indicates (see Table A.3 in the Appendix), there 
is a positive and statistically significant moderating effect of these factors. To facilitate 
interpretation of the complicated interaction pattern, we present average marginal effects of 
satisfaction with the national government on EP trust (with 95% confidence intervals) for 
different positions taken by parties on the issue of EU integration and separately for election 
winners (Figure 3[a]) and losers (Figure 3[b]). The two panels in the figure make apparent the 
differences in the slope for election winners and losers, which support H8. For election winners, 
the impact of their satisfaction with the national government on EP trust barely depends on the 
position these parties take on the issue of European integration. To the extent that there is an 
effect among election winners, satisfaction with the national government has a stronger impact on 
23 
 
trust in EP for those who support parties more markedly pro-EU integration. By contrast, for 
election losers, the association between spillover effects from domestic specific support to EP 
trust and the position taken by parties on the EU issue is strongly negative. Among the election 
losers, the spillover effects are shown to be more pronounced for partisans of Eurosceptic parties 
than for partisans of pro-integration parties. For the latter these effects are close to zero but still 
statistically significant.  
<FIGURE 3> 
Discussion and conclusion 
In a multi-level governance system like the EU, the citizens’ evaluations of outputs at the national 
level do not only have an impact on domestic diffuse support (as we also have shown), but they 
also directly and indirectly affect trust in European institutions. Specific support in the form of 
satisfaction with the national government depends on the citizens’ experiences with what the 
national political authorities deliver in terms of economic performance. In turn, specific support 
has implications for diffuse support not only at the national, but also at the European level. In line 
with previous literature that already documented spillover effects from domestic diffuse support 
to diffuse support at the EU level, we find that trust in the national parliament is positively 
associated with trust in the European parliament. In addition, we also find spillover effects of 
specific support (satisfaction with the national government) on trust in European institutions. 
These spillover effects are, however, much less important than suggested by the earlier literature 
once we control for the individuals’ overall levels of trust and satisfaction. 
In addition, we have shown that these spillover effects critically depend on the politicization of 
European integration. Our analyses suggest that the political context plays an important role on 
the extent to which we find a spillover effect from satisfaction with the national government to 
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trust in the European parliament. At critical moments of the EU integration process, when the 
salience of this issue is high, and when national governments play a highly visible role in the 
relationship between national and EU politics, the spillover effects from specific domestic to 
diffuse European support are stronger. We found that they are especially high for the two Euro-
crisis cases. At a time when both the Greek and Finnish governments were under strong pressure 
from parties and citizens critical to European positions, satisfaction with the domestic 
government had a stronger positive impact on trust in the European Parliament. Similar enhanced 
spillover effects also appear for the cases of the referenda in Ireland. As we also expected, 
satisfaction with governments that explicitly took critical stances towards the EU integration 
process was translated to a lesser extent into trust in the EP. As a matter of fact, the spillover 
effects estimated in those cases were almost zero. 
The results presented above highlight how diffuse EU support hinges on attitudes towards 
domestic institutions. We have not, however, so far referred to specific EU support or to citizens’ 
evaluations of the EU’s performance. Although the results suggest that most citizens hold 
national governments accountable for domestic policy performance (as we have seen for 
satisfaction with the economy), recent literature has suggested a rising awareness among the 
citizenry about the influence of the EU on domestic policy (e.g. Hobolt and Tilley 2014). In the 
context of the recent economic crisis, we observe an increase in the visibility and salience of the 
EU’s influence especially on the economic policies implemented in the countries most affected 
by the crisis. As a consequence, citizens  increasingly hold the EU responsible for poor 
performance and they increasingly become dissatisfied with the EU (specific support) and, as a 
result of spillovers, put less trust in the EU (diffuse support). The omission of this variable could 
be a problem for our results to the extent that it might generate some spuriousness in the 
association we find between domestic and EU diffuse support. Poor EU performance could be 
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driving down trust in the EU as well as trust in national institutions, especially in the context of 
European intervention in Southern European countries. Since the ESS does not include any item 
gauging this type of support, we unfortunately cannot account for EU specific support in our 
models.  
To indirectly assess the extent to which the omission of specific support could be causing 
spuriousness in the spillover effects of diffuse support from the national to the supranational 
level, we fit a regression model (building on model 2 in table 1) that allows for an interactive 
effect of the post-crisis period on the association between diffuse national and EU support (results 
are reported in Table A.4 in the supplemental appendix). Since we expect spuriousness to be 
especially problematic in the post crisis period, we expect a strong and substantial positive 
interactive effect between trust in the national parliament and the post-crisis indicator. And, 
indeed, the results of this model show that diffuse support for the EU decreases during the post-
crisis period (the constitutive term for the post-crisis indicator), while the spillover effect of 
diffuse national support to diffuse EU support is reinforced in the crisis. The reinforcement is 
small (0.016 increase in trust in the EP for every unit increase in trust in the national parliament 
in the post-crisis period), but statistically significant. This means that, as a result of the joint 
impact of specific EU support on both, diffuse national and diffuse EU support, the spillover 
effect of diffuse national on diffuse EU support may, indeed, be partially spurious. However, the 
fact that the pre-crisis spillover effect of diffuse national support on diffuse EU support is much 
more sizeable (0.148 unit increase in trust in the EP associated to a one-unit increase of trust in 
the national parliament) than the additional post-crisis effect suggests that the spurious element of 
the overall spillover is at best very partial. Moreover, recent research that has directly accounted 
for the impact of EU specific support still found a strong relationship between national and EU 
diffuse support (Armingeon and Ceka 2014).   
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It should be noted that Easton’s original theory of political support envisioned a political reality 
in which short-term evaluations of government performance did not directly and immediately 
affect diffuse support and only manifested themselves over time. To properly test such temporal 
dynamics, we would need panel data which we do not have, and this is a weakness of our 
research design. Recent studies, including our own, suggest that there might in fact be a direct 
relationship between the types of support, so future research would need to trace this relationship 
with a heightened attention to time.  
 The most important implication of our findings for understanding EU support is that the 
EU continues to be evaluated from decidedly national vantage points. Regardless of what the EU 
does, national actors, particularly political parties and governments, remain the key conduits for 
interpreting EU policies and their impact domestically. The level of politicization of European 
integration, however, determines the undertones of these interpretations. There is little doubt that 
the visibility of the EU and its actions has increased significantly since the beginning of the Great 
Recession. Still, recent research shows that even after we account for EU performance during the 
crisis, cues from the national context are crucial for diffuse support for the EU. Thus, the health 
of national economies and the resultant trust in national institutions is intrinsically linked to 
diffuse support for the EU, suggesting that prolonged economic downturn, such as the one 
Europe has witnessed since 2010, does not bode well for the legitimacy of the EU. 
 
 
Supporting data and materials for this article can be accessed on the Taylor & Francis website, 
doi: [publisher to add the doi at proof]. 
 
 
1 For evidence suggesting that diffuse support for EU institutions has proven highly stable in the context of the Great 
Recession see Ringlerova (2015). 
2 Because the CHES is conducted every four years the three rounds of the CHES were matched to two rounds of the 
ESS each (CHES 2002 for ESS 2002 and 2004, CHES 2006 for ESS 2006 and 2008, and CHES 2010 for ESS 2010 
and 2012). 
3 There are some instances in which in the CHES two parties are coded as a single unit but the corresponding parties 
are treated separately in the ESS (and vice versa). In the first case, voters of the two parties were assigned the same 
CHES code. In the second, we assigned voters the different parties in the coalition based on the party they felt closest 
to. Those who did not specify a party they felt close to were assigned the major party in the coalition. 
4 There is no trend in this respect across the six rounds. The countries and rounds included in the analyses are: 
Austria (rounds 1 to 3), Belgium (rounds 1 to 6), Bulgaria (rounds 4 to 6), Czech Republic (rounds 4 to 6), Germany 
(rounds 1 to 6), Denmark (rounds 1 to 6), Estonia (rounds 3 to 6), Spain (rounds 1 to 6), Finland (rounds 1 to 6), 
France (rounds 1 to 6), United Kingdom (rounds 1 to 6), Greece (rounds 1 to 2 and 4 to 5), Hungary (rounds 2 to 6), 
Ireland (rounds 2 to 6), Italy (round 1), Lithuania (rounds 5 to 6), Latvia (round 4), the Netherlands (rounds 1 to 6), 
Poland (rounds 2 to 6), Portugal (rounds 1 to 6), Romania (round 4), Sweden (rounds 1 to 6), Slovenia (rounds 2 to 
6), and Slovakia (rounds 2 to 6). 
5 The trust index was constructed as respondents’ average trust on: the legal system, the police, politicians and the 
United Nations. The satisfaction index was constructed as respondents’ average satisfaction with: his/her life as a 
whole, the state of education in his/her country, and the state of health services in his/her country. A factor analyses 
was conducted separately for each set of items, indicating that for each set all items strongly load on a single dimension, 
with only one eigenvalue above one. Results of the factor analyses are presented in tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. 
Cronbach’s α is of 0.804 for the trust syndrome and 0.643 for the satisfaction syndrome. Additional factor analyses 
were conducted separately by country and ESS round (not shown), they all return a one-factor solution. 
6 The third aspect – the expansion of the actors to non-executive actors – does not make sense here, since we are only 
dealing with one type of actors, i.e. political parties. 
7 A detailed description of how variables are coded is available in the online Appendix. 
8 The Czech Republic, which was the only other state to follow the British veto, later on adopted the ‘Treaty on 
stability, coordination and governance’ which covers the Fiscal compact. 
                                                          
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Although the assumption of uncorrelated residuals is unlikely to hold – there probably are exogenous variables 
jointly influencing our endogenous variables – this procedure still allows us to get an approximate estimate of the 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Regression analyses of trust in the European Parliament 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Baseline model 




Individual level    
Trust in national parliament 0.463*** 0.153*** 0.161*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Satisfaction with national government 0.136*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Satisfaction with the economy 0.061*** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Trust syndrome  0.708*** 0.708*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Satisfaction syndrome  -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Female 0.194*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Education 0.008*** 0.004** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Party-level    
Winner -0.241*** -0.131*** -0.130*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) 
Weighted EU position 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cross-level interactions    
Opposed government*Satisfaction with government   -0.084*** 
   (0.011) 
Eastern enlargement*Satisfaction with government   0.013 
   (0.015) 
Ireland*Satisfaction with government   0.079*** 
   (0.018) 
Finland*Satisfaction with government   0.164*** 
   (0.029) 
Greece*Satisfaction with government   0.110*** 
   (0.026) 
Opposed government*Trust   -0.055*** 
   (0.011) 
Eastern enlargement*Trust   -0.069*** 
   (0.014) 
Ireland*Trust   -0.069*** 
   (0.017) 
Finland*Trust   -0.026 
   (0.027) 
Greece*Trust   -0.044+ 
   (0.023) 
Country-year-level    
Opposed government   0.743** 
   (0.269) 
Eastern enlargement   1.398*** 
   (0.297) 
Ireland   0.270 
   (0.467) 
Finland   -1.231+ 
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   (0.644) 
Greece    -0.054 
   (0.693) 
IMF conditionality 0.032 -0.134 -0.104 
 (0.220) (0.267) (0.278) 
Politicization -0.626* -0.632+ -0.864** 
 (0.281) (0.340) (0.327) 
EU balance 0.292*** 0.376*** 0.385*** 
 (0.043) (0.053) (0.050) 
Constant 2.085*** 0.516*** 0.504*** 
 (0.126) (0.151) (0.144) 








Random-effects parameters    
Party-level    
Constant variance 0.038 0.034 0.032 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.0040) 
Observations 378 378 378 
    
Country-year-level    
Constant variance 0.294 0.442 0.382 
 (0.042) (0.062) (0.054) 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10    
 
Table 2: Regression analyses of attitudes towards domestic institutions 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Satisfaction with national 
government 
Trust in national 
parliament  
Individual level    
Satisfaction with government  0.218*** 
  (0.003) 
Satisfaction with the economy 0.484*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Trust syndrome  0.724*** 
  (0.003) 
Satisfaction syndrome 0.282*** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Female 0.015 -0.130*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Education 0.002 0.032*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.004*** 0.001+ 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Party-level   
Winner 0.969*** 0.014 
 (0.019) (0.015) 
Weighted EU position 0.007* 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Country-year-level   
IMF conditionality -0.038 -0.366** 
 (0.189) (0.135) 
Politicization -0.045 0.337+ 
 (0.252) (0.174) 
EU balance 0.025 -0.096*** 
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 (0.039) (0.027) 
Constant -0.296** -0.679*** 
 (0.116) (0.082) 
   
Observations 123,236 123,236 
Random-effects parameters   
Party-level   
Constant variance 0.184 0.029 
 (0.017) (0. .004) 
Observations 378 378 
   
Country-year-level   
Constant variance 0.198 0.108 
 (0.031) (0.016) 
Standard errors in parentheses   






Figure 1: Theoretical model for the relationship between specific and diffuse support in the multi-
level European polity 
 
 
Figure 2: Total effects of satisfaction with national government on trust in the European 
Parliament 
 
Note: Total effects of satisfaction with national government on trust in the European Parliament = 
(Direct effect of satisfaction with government on trust in the EP + effect of trust in national 






Figure 3: Average marginal effects of satisfaction with national government on trust in the EP 
 
 
